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Abstract—
Virtual reality (VR) headsets are enabling a wide range of new
opportunities for the user. For example, in the near future users
may be able to visit virtual shopping malls and virtually join
international conferences. These and many other scenarios pose
new questions with regards to privacy and security, in particular
authentication of users within the virtual environment. As a first
step towards seamless VR authentication, this paper investigates
the direct transfer of well-established concepts (PIN, Android
unlock patterns) into VR. In a pilot study (N = 5) and a lab
study (N = 25), we adapted existing mechanisms and evaluated
their usability and security for VR. The results indicate that
both PINs and patterns are well suited for authentication in
VR. We found that the usability of both methods matched the
performance known from the physical world. In addition, the
private visual channel makes authentication harder to observe,
indicating that authentication in VR using traditional concepts
already achieves a good balance in the trade-off between usability
and security. The paper contributes to a better understanding of
authentication within VR environments, by providing the first
investigation of established authentication methods within VR,
and presents the base layer for the design of future authentication
schemes, which are used in VR environments only.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Reality has recently become popular amongst
consumers [27], [31] due to the technological advancements
and the increased usability of the latest devices. The latter
is influenced by two developments: Firstly, Head Mounted
Displays (HMDs) such as the HTC Vive and the Daydream
View [36], [37] are readily available for households. Secondly,
these devices allow users to experience a virtual world at their
leisure with a great level of immersiveness [23].
HMDs are ubiquitous devices and high-end models are
striving towards being wireless [2]. Without the physical
connection to the PC, the device becomes a self contained
Fig. 1: We investigate how to create seamless and secure
authentication in VR. In particular, we compare different screen
sizes, input modalities, and password types with regard to
how secure they are against attackers in the real world. The
left image shows a sample view of a [virtual] large display
supporting lock pattern input in VR. The right image shows
a user in the real world, authenticating in this environment
whilst being observed by an attacker. The user is wearing a
head mounted display (HMD) and holding one controller in
each hand to enable interaction in VR.
headset with no external [physical] display. It is no longer
possible to login via keyboard and similarly not obvious who
is logged in when mounting the headset. Furthermore, sharing
them within a household or organization is a sought after
context, thus evolving from a single-user interaction model to
a multi-user one.
Although early adopters of VR have mainly been game
developers, some players in the e-commerce industry are
entering the market [11]. In addition, previous research has
highlighted the need for convenient authentication during
payment [26]. We opted to focus on e-commerce, especially the
authentication process, as the most relevant use case. However,
there are numerous other scenarios where authentication would
be needed, such as telepresence meetings or access to virtual
resources owned by a company. Digital real-time handshakes
may be done through authentication, for example at a virtual
conference, where it will be crucial for the perception of security
to confirm the identity with a known attribute between multiple
subjects in VR. The above points combined with the fact
that users long for a perception of security and trust during
engagement in VR [35], motivate the need for authentication
within the virtual world.
While authentication has been explored for multiple do-
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mains [52], [57], to our knowledge, seamless authentication
in VR, without taking the HMD off, has not been explored.
We argue that it is not acceptable from a user experience
viewpoint to require users to constantly take off the VR headset
in order to provide credentials (e.g., credit card number) to
perform an in-app purchase. A simple solution might be that
users could provide their sensitive credentials only once on a
desktop computer. Users could then access these credentials
by seamlessly authenticating from within the VR environment
without having to take off the headset. It is an interesting
question whether existing concepts for authentication in the real
world can be transferred to interaction within virtual worlds.
Furthermore, we believe VR has the potential to act as a
feasible research tool for usable security studies. We envision
that authentication methods will be an essential part of VR
in the near future and understanding their constraints allows
the design of more adequate solutions. To close this gap, this
paper evaluates whether currently established methods from
other domains (e.g., [physical] public displays [34] and mobile
phones) are feasible in a VR environment. Our choice to model
virtual counterparts of [medium sized physical] public displays
and [small sized physical] mobile phones into virtual reality is
due to their difference in size and placement, allowing us to
build on existing research to create a broad design space for
virtual authentication surfaces in VR. We conducted a lab study
which explored eight concepts (2 password types × 4 input
modalities) to understand their usability, and applicability to VR.
Furthermore, we explore the security of these schemes by eval-
uating their resistance to observation attacks. We observed that
VR experiences differ from previous research on observation-
resistant authentication because (1) the observer does not have
any visual cues (such as a [physical] mobile display), (2) mid-air
interactions (with [virtual] controllers) provide a new channel
for observing password related information or hints about the
observed password, and (3) users that are immersed in the
VR experience do not notice that someone is observing them
during authentication, leading to a decrease in awareness of their
surroundings. Thus, we conducted a security study to measure
the observability of the previously mentioned methods.
A. Contribution Statement
The contributions of this work are threefold: (1) We
describe the concept development and implementation of
multiple authentication methods for VR, which are based on
previous work in the domains of [physical] public displays
and [physical] mobile devices. (2) We report on our findings
from a lab study (n = 25) where we investigated the usability
and security of the proposed methods. (3) We discuss the
usability and security implications of authentication in VR. Our
findings are valuable to designers and practitioners working
on authentication mechanisms in VR who need to get a better
understanding of this problem and design space before creating
novel ideas.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work builds on two main strands of related work: (1)
Interaction in virtual reality, and (2) established authentication
concepts in other environments.
A. Interaction in VR
One challenge of interaction with objects in VR is the
lack of tactile feedback. This issue is known to influence the
usability of input systems in VR [15]. Over the years, haptic or
force feedback has tried to fill this gap with promising results:
One example is in VR training [49], where surgical procedure
is practised in VR and interactions are aided by haptic feedback
to mimic real world progress. According to Leung et al. [28],
this form of feedback was also shown to reduce cognitive
load on mobile devices when it replaces certain parts of the
graphical interface. This finding is interesting for VR, as the
3D environment relies heavily on graphical interfaces and could
hence benefit from reducing the visual cognition, which often
leads to visual fatigue [48]. As a result of these findings, we
implemented haptic feedback into our concepts.
Using pointers (i.e., virtual laser beam) was discouraged as
an interaction method in VR, as (1) they are not a natural way of
interacting in real life without additional hardware and (2) due
to (previous technological) lack of precision [19]. However,
the accuracy, that state-of-the-art HMD controllers provide,
combined with the successful results of pointer interaction
on [physical] public displays [46], [10], encourage revisiting
the usability of this input method. Another way to interact in
VR is by tapping, which was also shown to be promising for
interactions in the real world [4]. Hence we decided to consider
both, tapping and pointers in our concept development.
According to McGill et al. [32] “Immersiveness is quantified
by presence” and presence is affected by the visual quality
of the scene. Other factors that influence presence include
the quality of the HMD’s head tracking, and even how users
interact with virtual objects [22]. All of the above mentioned
points have increased in quality and usability over the last few
years, which leads to fully immersed users in VR who are less
aware of their surroundings [32]. With this lack of awareness,
VR users become more susceptible to observers from the real
world, who could eavesdrop users as they authenticate in VR.
B. Authentication concepts in other environments
Previous research on authentication in virtual environments
on 2D devices has highlighted the value of 3D passwords
as an alternative to common authentication mechanisms, with
the assumption that they are highly secure whilst also being
less prone to shoulder surfing attacks [3], [12], [29]. As 3D
passwords are not yet widely accepted, we start with accepted
methods, namely PINs and Patterns (Android Unlock Pattern).
They (1) are the status-quo for time-efficient authentication
[52] and (2) are well integrated in current infrastructures (e.g.,
database backends). Although PINs and Patterns are widely
used on mobile devices, one of the main drawbacks of this
authentication mechanism is that they are prone to observation
attacks [24], [30], [50], [52], [58].
Biometric authentication is gaining in popularity on commer-
cial devices [17]. However, unlike knowledge-based schemes,
biometric passwords are hard to reissue. Furthermore, privacy
aware users are hesitant towards sharing their biometric data
with third-parties [38]. Although biometric authentication is an
important ongoing research area for HMD interaction [40], [42],
this paper only focuses on the still indispensable knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms.
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Fig. 2: HTC Vive controllers have the same look and feel in the virtual and real world. Figure (A) shows a view of the physical
controllers in the real world during the study. Figure (B) shows how they are replicated in the virtual world. Figure (C) shows
the buttons we utilized for the different input modalities: Pointer uses only the trigger whereas Pointeronclick uses a combination
of the trigger and trackpad.
Mid-air authentication schemes have been evaluated in real
world scenarios [7], [39], [56], [57], showing promising results
from a usability and security perspective. Yadav et. al [57]
explored PIN entry in augmented reality systems which were
perceived to be usable but entry times were substantially higher
than on mobile phones (Google Glass = ∼ 8s-14s, Mobile
Phone = ∼1.96s [20]). However the combination of existent
visual cues and mid-air interactions has not been explored in
prior research to our knowledge.
Although observers do not perceive the visual cues (view of
VR scene) that the users see, previous research has pointed out
other sources that support guessing the password. For example,
Sasamoto et. al [41] found that haptic feedback from the input
system provides insight into the correct password. Previous
work investigated risk of side channel attacks through oily
residues [8], [43], [53] and heat traces [1], [33] of the users’
fingers left on the hardware. Although these types of attacks
may be applicable to the VR setting in the future, for example
after development of biometric authentication, we do not believe
that they are applicable at this point in the technological
development of the HMD. In this paper we provide the first
evaluation of the usability and security of different established
authentication methods in VR based on PINs and patterns, to
provide an understanding for authentication during commercial
and collaborative scenarios in VR.
III. THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, the victim is wearing an HMD and
interacting with a virtual world (virtual or mixed reality). The
victim is authenticating in that environment in the presence of
others. In our scenario the setting is a personal living room,
where friends and family are present [21]. Anyone surrounding
the victim in the real world has perfect sight on the hand
movements that are performed in order to interact with the
authentication system, but cannot see what the user sees in
the HMD. Unlike shoulder surfing in the real world [16], the
attacker in our threat model has the advantage of not being
seen by the user. The victim authenticates with PIN and pattern
in order to complete an in-app purchase during game play and
immediately after authenticating, she takes off the headset in
order to step out for a break. The attacker picks up the headset,
continues playing the game and when prompted authenticates
for another in-app purchase with the victim’s password.
IV. PILOT STUDY AND CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
At the outset of our work we conducted a pilot study
to identify important design factors and explore different
modalities. In particular, we compared (1) different input
modalities, (2) different sizes of the input screen, and (3)
different password types. Results from the pilot study serve
as the basis for an in-depth investigation of security in the
subsequent main study.
A. Study Design
The study followed a repeated measure design, with size
of input surface, password type, and input modality being the
independent variables. Password types (PIN and pattern) and
input modalities are based on existing research in the field of
usable security as well as on properties of commercial VR
controllers, such as the [phyisical] HTC Vive controllers that
the user is always holding during the study (Fig.1). The size of
input surfaces was chosen based on [virtual] interactive surfaces
that we expect to be commonly available in VR environments.
The following sections describe the independent variables
and their characteristics. With these variables, we are describing
variations of the input modalities and input surfaces which
are offered to the user in the virtual world. In adherence
with established interaction practices for VR [6], [25], [47],
we also displayed a virtual representation of the physical
controller in virtual reality (Figure 2AB). There was a one-
to-one mapping between the two, hence the location and the
visual representation of the controllers were the same in the
real and virtual world.
1) Input Modalities: We defined six different input modali-
ties. They are motivated by the input capabilities of state-of-
the-art VR controllers.
Firstly, we compare different [virtual] laser pointers that
differ in how selections are made on the [physical] controller.
Pointer This [virtual] pointer is constantly visible during the
authentication process, casting a [virtual] beam on the
authentication interface. Selections are made by a button
press (Figure 2C).
Pointeronclick In contrast to the first [virtual] pointer, a [virtual]
beam is only cast upon a button press on the [physical]
controller. To make a selection, a second [physical] button
press is required (Figure 2C).
Furthermore, we included two versions of tapping by means
of the [physical] VR controller.
Tap For this interaction modality, users authenticate by tapping
the [virtual] authentication surface with the [virtual] VR
controller. This is an adopted form of touching a screen,
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Input Modalities Size of input interface
Surfacelarge Surfacemedium Surfacesmall
Pointer Large/Pointer Medium/Pointer
Pointeronclick Large/Pointeronclick Medium/Pointeronclick
Tap Medium/Tap
Taponclick Medium/Taponclick
Stylus Small/Stylus
TABLE I: Overview of conditions used in the pilot study.
Highlighted concepts showed promising results in the pilot
study, hence they were defined as conditions in the main study.
as we know it from [physical] public displays [5], using
ones hand.
Taponclick We included a modality, where users would press a
[physical] controller button, subsequently hover over the
[virtual] element to select, and finally release the [physical]
button to make the selection. This mimics the behavior
of pattern input on a [physicial] touch screen where only
lifting the finger finalizes the input, instead of a dedicated
confirm button [13].
Finally, we included a stylus type interaction modality.
Stylus Adapted from the interaction on [physical] mobile
devices, a pen-like interaction modality, commonly known
as stylus, was modelled into VR to allow for interaction
with small [virtual] surfaces.
2) Size of Input Surface: We experimented with three sizes
of the input surface in the pilot study. Due to their size and
nature, each of them can only be navigated with a specific
input modality.
Surfacelarge Unlike in the real world, VR allows interactive
surfaces to be easily integrated with arbitrary objects.
Hence, authentication can be seamlessly integrated with
the user’s task. We found the idea to enable interaction
on a large-sized [virtual] surface particularly compelling,
since this could allow authentication from afar as well as
while the user is moving.
Surfacemedium Motivated by work on [physical] public dis-
plays, we opted to investigate medium-size [virtual]
surfaces where interaction is within arm’s reach [9]. As
input modalities we compare both [virtual] pointer and
both [virtual] tap modalities.
Surfacesmall Finally, we decided to include small surfaces as
known from personal devices, such as smartphones. Here,
the [virtual] authentication interfaces were projected onto
the [virtual] controller held by the user’s non-dominant
hand (Fig.2B). As interaction modalities we used the
[virtual] stylus.
In the pilot study the above mentioned input surfaces and
input modalities were tested as combined concepts. All tested
combinations are depicted in Table I.
3) Password Types: Our research focuses on the usability
and observability of established Password types, namely PIN
and Pattern. PIN describes a numerical authentication method
and Pattern is based on the Android Lock Pattern. Our
implementation of the authentication schemes was similar to
the respective implementations on mobile devices. The interface
of PINs (Figure 3A) consisted of 10 digits (0-9), a button to
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Fig. 3: Our [virtual] implementation of the PIN pad imitates
the usage on mobile phones. The special characters (e.g., back
button) are replaced by a red button for deleting the last digit
and a green button for submitting the four digit PIN (A). The
[virtual] interface of patterns consisted of a 9-point grid (B).
clear the last digit, and a submit button. While the interface of
Patterns (Figure 3B) consisted of a 9-point grid.
B. Apparatus
We used Unity 3D and an HTC Vive headset with controllers
for our prototype implementation. For interfacing with the HTC
Vive we relied on the SteamVR Plugin for Unity provided by
Valve software, which handles camera and controller tracking
while providing easy access to button states and haptic feedback.
The latter was provided to the customer through the [physical]
controller (Figure 3C), upon selection of a button for PIN and
upon selection of a cell grid for pattern. All programming was
done in C#.
We created a controller script which (1) would alternate
the input methods presented to the participants according to
a predefined latin square and (2) generate the visual of the
correct password to be entered. This script would then also
track successful and failed input attempts and automatically
advance to the next step after the desired number of inputs.
C. Procedure
A total of 5 participants (mean age=24 SD=1.6, 2 females)
took part in the pilot study. To start, we asked them to sign a
consent form. Then they were taken through a training in virtual
reality and introduced to the input surfaces and interaction
modalities. Once they felt comfortable, they were asked to
enter a pre-defined PIN and password for each condition.
D. Results and Implications
The concepts in Figure I showed promising results. As such
they were chosen to be analyzed further as part of the main
study. In the following we summarize the results that led to our
concept choices and discuss in detail the implications for their
designs. In the main study they are defined as conditions. The
following naming convention is used: SurfaceSize/Modality.
1) Large Surfaces: When authenticating with a [virtual]
pointer on the large [virtual] surface, we noticed that users
performed noticeable head movements. We found this to clearly
aid the observability of the entered password/PIN. To weaken
the effect, we decided to adjust the size of the authentication
surface (γ), considering the field of view in the HMD (FOV:
110°), the degree of perception for near-peripheral vision (α:
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Fig. 4: The figure illustrates the different [virtual] input surfaces and [virtual] input methods that we experimented with for
patterns (A, B, C and D) and PIN based interfaces (E, F, G, and H). We covered pointer-based input methods (A, B, E, F),
where a [virtual] laser-like pointer is used to signal input, [virtual] tap-based methods (C, G), in which the user touches the
UI elements with the [virtual] representation of the physical controller held by the user, and finally stylus-based methods (D,
H), where the user had a [virtual] short-range pointer that allows interaction with small [virtual] close-by surfaces. The images
show the [virtual] presentation of the input surfaces. The stylus-based methods (D, H) also show the [virtual] representation of
the physical controller, in addition to a [virtual] input surface is mounted onto the [virtual] controller. The [virtual] avatar is a
mock-up representation of the [physical] participant in each condition to illustrate the proportional distance to the [virtual] input
surfaces.
60°), and the distance to input modality (β : 3.17m) using the
following formula:
tan(
1
2
×α)×2×β = γ (1)
Participants were able to perform accurate input with both
[virtual] pointers on the large [virtual] surface. Yet, participants
had a preference for the always visible [virtual] pointer. In
addition they found it quite challenging to press two [physical]
buttons concurrently while focusing on the authentication task.
Hence, we decided to exclude the onclick [virtual] pointer
from further investigations. For the main study we defined a
condition: Large/Pointer (Figure 4A,E).
2) Medium Surfaces: Also for medium size [virtual] sur-
faces, participants performed well with both the regular [virtual]
pointer and with the onclick [virtual] pointer. Yet, again, the
onclick feature turned out to be distracting during the main
task of authentication. As a result we decided to use only the
regular [virtual] pointer for the main study. We made similar
observations for [virtual] tap. While the regular [virtual] tapping
could be easily performed, participants struggled to understand
how the [physical] controller can be used in the onclick variant.
Therefore, we chose to use Tap for interaction with medium
size [virtual] surfaces.
Hence we added two more conditions to the main study:
Medium/Pointer and Medium/Tap (Figure 4B,F).
3) Small Surfaces: Participants performed well with the
[virtual] stylus, which is in line with prior research where text
entry with short [virtual] laser pointers was found to be efficient
[14]. However, we found that collisions between [physical]
controllers frequently occurred as participants tried to make a
selection with the [virtual] stylus controller in the dominant
hand on the small [virtual] surface that was attached to the
virtual representation of the controller held in the non-dominant
hand. Hence, we display the [virtual] authentication interface
at a small distance.
This resulted in adding another condition to the main study:
Small/Stylus (Figure 4D,H).
E. Summary and Implications
Based on the results, we defined 8 input methods for the
main study: 4 for PIN and 4 for patterns (see Figure 4).
Since password complexity can influence both usability
(entry time, error rate) and security (observation resistance),
we included passwords in the pilot study, that had a variety
of characteristics. We chose characteristics that were shown to
have an influence on the usability and security of passwords:
Knight Moves, Intersections, and Overlaps. A knight move is a
term used by von Zezschwitz et.al to describe the connection of
two non-neighbouring cells on a pattern grid [51]. In addition
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to characteristics defined in prior work, we added “Translations”
which we define as PINs/patterns that can exist in multiple
relative locations on the authentication grid (see example in
Figure 5). We found that translatable PINs/patterns are more
difficult to observe due to the absence of visual cues from the
observer’s perspective.
Similarly, we considered characteristics of PINs that could
potentially influence the difficulty of entering and observing
them, for example repetitive or neighbouring digits [57],
and translations. For the main study we decided to focus
on translations exclusively, since the effect is similar to
neighbouring digits. Repetitions were excluded for that they
decrease the password space.
V. MAIN STUDY
We conducted a lab study to (1) examine whether established
usable security mechanisms can be adapted to virtual reality
systems with HMDs and (2) explore the usability and security
of the tested authentication methods in Virtual Reality.
There is no IRB for these kinds of studies at our institution,
nonetheless we adhered to known standards (e.g., collected
data anonymously) within the research area, made participants
aware of the data sharing policy, and obtained their consent to
publish the results.
A. Study Design
1) Independent Variables: The study followed a repeated
measure design. Conditions were counterbalanced using a Latin
square. We specified two independent variables, as described
in the previous section:
1) Four combinations of [virtual] surface size and input
modality: (a) Large/Pointer, (b) Medium/Pointer, (c)
Medium/Tap, and (d) Small/Stylus (see Figure 4)
2) Password type: (a) PIN, and (b) Pattern.
PINs had a length of four digits, while patterns had a length
between five and six cells. This was done to make sure that PINs
and patterns covered a comparable theoretical password space
and hence were comparable [53]. Both password types were
randomly generated, whilst also ensuring that the properties
mentioned in the pilot study were equally distributed across
the password space. Each participant had a random set of
passwords and none of them were the same.
2) Dependent Variables: The dependent variables of the
usability study were (1) entry time, captured from the start of
the engagement with the [virtual] interface until the password
was entered through an "Enter" button (standard interaction
for PIN) or the end of the drawing action (for Pattern); and
(2) error rate, measured with a binary system, such that if
all cells were correctly entered the system would provide a
success message (visual and in form of text).
For the observability study, the success rate of attacking
a password was measured in two ways: Firstly binary, by
measuring how many passwords were attacked successfully
(1=successful, 0=unsuccessful). Successful means that the
observed password matched all cells of the attacked password.
Secondly, we evaluated the degree of success by using an
(adapted) evaluation tool based on the Damerau-Levenshtein
(a) Option 1 (b) Option 2
Fig. 5: Patterns that can exist at multiple locations on the grid.
We refer to this move as a “Translattion”
distance algorithm. For patterns, the algorithm calculates how
many lines (connected by two cells) would have to be adjusted
in order to match the correct password. Although participants
had three guesses, only the guess with the least distance was
considered for further analysis; that is, the guess that was
closest to the correct password.
B. Procedure
We used the same apparatus as in the pilot study. As
participants arrived in the lab, participants did the usability study
first. In the initial briefing they were given a printed paper with
details on the procedure of the study. They were taken through
the instructions and had the opportunity to ask questions. Then
they were asked to complete a short questionnaire to capture
demographic data and a likert scale questionnaire to obtain
previous experience with virtual reality and password entry
methods.
This was followed by an instruction on using the HTC Vive,
the room setup and their play area (cf. Figure 1). Participants
were also advised about possible risks when using an HMD and
encouraged to stop at any point during the study if unwanted
side effects occurred. Then, the HMD was mounted onto
participants’ heads and they were advised about the various
forms of video recording. Whenever they felt ready in the
virtual world, they were asked to verbally instruct to start the
study. At the beginning of each study, participants were asked
to complete a training session, which involved entering each
password type three times successfully for each input method.
Upon completing the training session, participants pro-
ceeded with the actual study. Each password had to be
successfully entered in each of three rounds to proceed to
the next password. Participants were not limited in time and
number of attempts within each round. However, after a
possible second failed attempt, they were given additional
verbal support by the instructor. After a successful attempt, the
system would automatically move onto the next round. After all
passwords were entered, the usability session was concluded by
a questionnaire where participants provided subjective feedback
about the input methods, and the perceived level of presence
[44].
Subsequently, the security session was conducted (Figure 1,
participant without an HMD is acting as the attacker) Partic-
ipants were first explained the procedure: their task was to
observe a user while authenticating in VR in real-time, and try
to guess the entered password. Participants were given a pen
and draft paper on which they could take notes while observing.
We further provided participants with templates in which they
could draw the observed patterns. The experimenter walked the
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participants through the template and explained how to indicate
the starting and ending node of each observed pattern. Each
session consisted of 16 shoulder surfing attacks (2 attacks per
condition). The passwords were entered by an expert VR user
in order to reduce possible errors and to maintain a constant
complexity level for all observations. The same expert VR
user authenticated throughout the security session. Before each
attack, the participant was told which password type and input
method will be used, and was guided using the illustrations
shown in Figure 4. Each of them had already taken part in
the usability study with the same passwords, they were once
again introduced to all the variants and educated to a point that
they could be considered expert attackers. Participants were
encouraged to move around freely within the physical space
of the room to better observe the password in the real world.
For each attack, participants could provide up to three guesses.
They were then informed about the rewarding mechanism;
in addition being offered a 10 EUR online shop voucher, all
participants joined a raffle for an additional 20 EUR where
each participant’s chances of winning increased depending on
how many passwords were successfully observed. This was
done to encourage participants to put an effort in observing the
passwords. We concluded with a semi-structured interview and
a likert scale questionnaire to capture feedback on the tested
input modalities.
C. Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited from University
mailing lists. A demographics questionnaire revealed that the
average age was 23.28 (SD=2.5), and that 62% had no prior
experience with VR but 80% used either PINs or Patterns
before. There were 15 male and 10 female participants. All
twenty-five participants took part in the usability and security
study.
VI. RESULTS
Our research did not aim at showing that one of the
methods is superior to the other. Therefore we did not include
hypotheses but rather followed a descriptive research approach
to understand the performance of established methods.
The usability was measured with Likert scale questionnaires,
by capturing entry times, error counts and by conducting semi-
structured interviews. The shoulder-surfing vulnerability was
measured in terms of performance and user opinion captured
by a Likert scale questionnaire and a semi structured interview.
We did not find any outstandingly performing participants in
the usability and the security study.
A. Usability
1) Perceived Usability – After Usability Task: On a 5-
point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree),
participants indicated preferences for ease of password entry
and perception of security. Friedmans test showed that there
was a statistically significant difference in perceived usability
depending on which type of method was used for authentication,
χ2(7) = 23.99, p = 0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests with Bonferroni correction elicited a statis-
tically significant difference in usability perception between
Mediumpointer and Mediumtap (Z = -2.64, p = 0.008). However,
Fig. 6: Mean values and standard deviations for entry times
across password type and round.
median usability rating was 4.0 for all conditions. There were no
significant results found between the other methods (Figure 8).
The Likert scale also showed that participants experienced a
good presence (median=3).
2) Entry Time: Visual inspection showed that our data was
normally distributed and Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated
that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated for the
results described in this section.
A repeated measures ANOVA determined that password
type had a significant effect on entry time (F1,24 = 19.667,
p < 0.001). Post-hoc analysis showed a significant difference
(p < 0.001) between pattern (Mean = 3.22, SD = 0.118) and
PIN (Mean = 2.743, SD = 0.126).
Results showed that entry time differed statistically de-
pending on configuration (F3,72 = 16.877, p < 0.001) across
all passwords entered. Mediumtap(Mean = 3.6, SD = 0.18) is
significantly slower (p < 0.001) than all other methods for
both PIN and Pattern entry time. The same phenomenon was
also found to be true when comparing methods within each
password type separately (Figure 7).
Figure 6 shows results that also indicated a positive learning
curve for both password types (F2,48 = 64.253, p < 0.001).
Pairwise comparisons confirmed (p < 0.05) that in round 3
(Mean = 2.679, SD = 0.120) participants completed the input
22% quicker than in round 1 (Mean = 3.414, SD = 0.127).
3) Error Rate: We also logged the number of errors
performed by the users. The error rate was a binary value
that is either true or false based on whether or not the user
provided the entire PIN/Pattern successfully. Note, that in this
study users were provided the passwords by experimenters.
From 81 wrong attempts (of a total of 1281 entries) across
all rounds and passwords, 82% occurred during pattern entry
and 18% during PIN entry. A possible explanation for this
could be that pattern entry is a motor task. It has been shown
that learning such tasks is in general slow and users get easily
disrupted [45], which may have been the case in our VR setting.
B. Security
1) Perceived Security – Before Observation Task: We
analyzed the perceived security after participants had entered
passwords, but before they had started the observation task.
Friedmans test showed that there was a statistically significant
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difference in perceived security depending on which type
of method was used for authentication, χ2(7) = 35.40, p =
0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting
in a significant difference in perception of security between
Mediumpointer and Mediumtap (Z = -3.098, p = 0.002) for
Patterns. This was also found to be true for the password type
PIN (Z = -2.951, p = 0.003).
2) Success rate and Levenshtein distance: The majority of
observation attacks was unsuccessful, as out of 400 entered
passwords 18% were guessed correctly. This is significantly
smaller compared to the attacker success rate for PIN and
pattern on mobile phones [50], [51]. However, within the num-
ber of successfully observed passwords, we found significant
results:
We ran an ANOVA test with the Damerau-Levenshtein
distance between the guess and the most correct password of the
three guess attempts as a DV. The data was normally distributed,
sphericity was not violated (Mauchly’s Test: X(2)(5) = 3.081,
p=0.688) and there were no significant outliers. Results showed
that success rates for guessing PINs differed statistically signif-
icantly depending on Input Method (F3,72 = 4.8, p < 0.01). We
found observations made from the Mediumpointer(Mean = 0.48,
SD = 0.57) to be significantly smaller in distance (p < 0.01) to
the correct pattern than for Largepointer(Mean = 0.7, SD = 0.45)
and Mediumtap(Mean = 0.66, SD = 0.49), where 1 is a perfect
match to the correct password and 0 is an unsuccessful attack.
This means that guesses against Mediumpointer are closer to the
correct PIN compared to Largepointer.
After evaluating Patterns with the same analysis, we found
that success rates differed statistically significantly depending
on Input Method (F3,72 = 5.2, p < 0.01). However, observations
made from the Mediumpointer ((Mean = 0.43, SD = 0.06)) were
found to be significantly larger in distance (p < 0.05) to the
correct pattern than for Largepointer (mean=0.2, SD=0.04) and
Mediumtap ((Mean = 0.19, SD = 0.09)), where 1 is a perfect
match to the correct password and 0 is an unsuccessful attack.
3) Perceived Security - After Observation Task: Further
data gathered after completion of the security study from the
likert scale questionnaires showed that there was a statistically
significant difference in perceived security depending on which
type of method was used for authentication, χ2(7) = 46.69, p =
0.001. Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with a
Bonferroni correction applied, elicited a statistically significant
difference in experienced usability between Mediumpointer and
Mediumtap (Z = -3.22, p = 0.001) for Patterns. This was also
found to be true for the password type PIN (Z = -3.84, p =
0.001).
Qualitative feedback from the semi structured interviews
also showed that multiple participants were looking for haptic
cues from the [physical] HTC Vive controller in order to guess
passwords, as investigated in previous research [41]. However,
our quantitative data did not show that participants performed
better who noticed these cues.
VII. LIMITATIONS
This paper provides first insights into authentication in
virtual reality and as such we were only able to investigate 8
Fig. 7: Mean values and standard deviations for entry times
across password type and input modality.
concepts (4 input modalities and 2 passwords). Our research
focuses on importing well established methods from authenti-
cation on [medium sized physical] public displays and [small
sized physical] mobile devices into virtual reality. However, we
are aware that there are other feasible methods that have proven
to show a good trade-off between security and usability, which
are also applicable to a VR environment. We believe that this
is a first step to establish authentication in VR, opening doors
for further detailed comparisons of methods and interaction
opportunities.
Due to the usage of university mailing lists for recruiting
participants, our sample only reflects a certain demographic:
We believe that they may be more technology aware, compared
to the general population and that the majority were students.
However, this is one of the main target groups for our concepts.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We investigated the feasibility of established authentication
methods in virtual environments. In addition to specific results
according to usability and security, we gathered general insights
into the characteristics of seamless authentication. This section
points out the main findings and discusses their implications.
A. Established Concepts are Usable in Virtual Reality
The results indicate that currently established real-world
authentication methods can be directly transferred into virtual
reality. In fact, the measured performance matches the data
collected in previous real-world experiments. Summarizing all
tested conditions, PIN users required an overall average of
2.7 seconds to authenticate while pattern users needed 3.2
seconds. Comparing the performance of PINs and patterns on
mobile devices in a controlled setting (PINs = 1.5 s, patterns
= 3.14 s) [52] to their performance in VR suggests that
established concepts are promising to be run and evaluated in
VR. Although patterns were measurably more error-prone than
PINs, both concepts were rated to be comparably easy to use by
participants. Using established methods is relatively beneficial
for both the user and remote services. While users face a
lower barrier to entry for authentication in virtual environments
when they are already familiar with the used systems, remote
services are not required to modify their back-end. Thus they
can serve real-world users and virtual reality users with the
same infrastructures.
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Fig. 8: Results of likert scale questionnaire "How much do you agree with the following statement: "It is difficult to guess a
password that is entered with this input modality"? in median values.
However, even if our findings indicate that established
authentication methods are usable in virtual environments, we
do not claim that they represent the optimal solution for any use
case. We assume that some scenarios may benefit from novel
authentication concepts. We argue that there are practically no
limits to support a user’s mental model in the virtual world.
For example, a novel concept could mimic a physical key
chain which opens a visualized password safe to illustrate the
functionality of such tools.
B. Seamless Authentication Improves Practical Security
In addition to the promising usability results, we found
that seamless authentication made established methods like
PIN and patterns more resistant to observation attacks. This
indicates that seamless authentication in virtual environments
can solve practical security problems without reducing usability.
Related work revealed that both Android unlock patterns [51]
and PINs [50] are prone to shoulder surfing attacks, when
used in the physical world. That is, the user’s credentials
face practical risks when users have to interrupt their virtual
experience to authenticate with a service in the physical world.
In contrast, seamless authentication in the virtual world makes
authentication more observation resistant and at the same time
improves user experience.
We argue that authentication in virtual environments can
improve practical security as the HMD serves as a secret
channel between the user and the system. While established
methods already perform well, we assume that the security
could be further improved by switching to already published
security-optimized concepts (e.g., [18], [54], [55]).
C. Interaction Style and Presentation Matter
While the results of both patterns and PINs were promising
in terms of usability and security, we found that the characteris-
tics of interaction and presentation have significant effects
on authentication speed. Overall, we tested three different
surface sizes and two different interaction methods and found
that not every condition works equally well. Overall the
pointer conditions performed better, especially tapping on
medium surfaces performed significantly worse than pointing
on medium surfaces. In other words, we found a tendency
that mimicking [physical] mobile authentication (i.e., small
surface) and horizon-based authentication (i.e., large surface)
outperformed the simulation of authentication on [physical]
public displays (i.e., medium surface).
On one hand, this finding generally implies that presentation
and interaction style have significant impact on usability. On the
other hand, this points out in detail that feasible solutions are
not required to mimic scenarios of the physical world. Indeed,
one of the conditions which worked better (i.e., horizon-based
authentication with a laser pointer) has no physical counterpart.
The advantages of [physical] smartphone-like authentica-
tion [on small surfaces] over [physical] public display-like
authentication [on medium sized surfaces] may be explained
by the fact that users were more familiar with [physical]
smartphones than with [physical] public displays. This would
indicate that mimicking familiar authentication environments
can be beneficial in terms of usability. Nevertheless, such effects
need to be systematically evaluated to draw valid conclusions.
D. Virtual Reality as a Feasible Research Tool
The evaluation of established authentication mechanisms
in virtual environments showed that virtual reality is a feasible
test bed for usable security studies. If adequate precautions
are taken (e.g., training tasks), virtual reality environments can
be utilized to simulate the real world or to create scenarios
which are not bound to the physical world. We argue that this
makes virtual reality a useful and valid research tool for usable
security studies.
On one hand, the virtual environment can be used as a cost-
effective way to gather preliminary insights on environmental
impact without the need to perform a real-world field study. For
example, one could simulate authentication in crowded places
or effects of different light conditions. On the other hand, the
virtual world enables user studies which cannot be realized in
the real world. One example would be to test the effects of
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visual feedback for free-hand gestures by visualizing the path
of the user’s hands. However, even though our results indicate
that the performance in virtual environments is comparable to
the performance in the physical world, the relation of these
two worlds needs to be further investigated in the future.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a systematic evaluation of
established authentication mechanisms for virtual reality (VR)
with head mounted displays. For this purpose, we designed eight
authentication concepts using PIN and patterns. The [virtual]
concepts were based on different interaction mechanisms and
presentation styles. Our results indicate that well-established
methods from previous research, gathered from real world
scenarios on [small sized physical] mobile phones and [medium
sized physical] public displays, can successfully be adopted
into VR. It was found that [virtual] pointer interactions on small
and large [virtual] surfaces worked best for authentication in
VR. The tested concepts were comparably usable as in the real
world but input was significantly harder to observe. We therefore
conclude that seamless authentication in VR environments can
solve practical security problems without reducing usability.
Since this work showed promising results for VR au-
thentication, future work should focus on the methods that
inclined to work better in VR, most importantly the ones
that had no physical counterpart (i.e., large surface pointer
interaction). We plan to analyse how the user’s mental model
can be supported better, when defining a password as well as
during the real-time authentication process. Furthermore, we
want to explore additional use cases for VR authentication,
such as collaboration, where digital handshakes may be done
through authentication. For example, visitors of a virtual
conference could greet each other with a secure handshake
by authenticating in real-time in VR, thus enabling seamless
and secure collaborations. Finally, we argue that virtual reality
could serve as a feasible test bed to simulate and evaluate
complex authentication scenarios. Therefore, we strive at further
understanding the comparability of the virtual and the physical
world in the context of usable security.
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